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Abstract
Using data on cross border transactions together with an informative measure of ﬁnancing
constraints this paper provides new evidence that limited access to external capital narrows the
scale of foreign sales, the exporters’ product scope and the number of trade partners. It shows
that constrained ﬁrms have a reduced probability of adding and a higher probability of drop-
ping products and destinations. Further it documents that constrained ﬁrms sell their products at
higher prices as compared to unconstrained ﬁrms. All the results are robust to speciﬁc control
for unobserved heterogeneity, self-selection into export and potential endogeneity of the ﬁnancial
constraints proxy.
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11 Introduction
Informational asymmetries and imperfect screening in capital or credit markets giveraise to situations
where ﬁnancing constraints prevent potentially successful and growth enhancing projects or busi-
nesses to be undertaken. There are a few reasons why access to ﬁnance plays a particularly important
role for ﬁrms involved in export activities. Firstly, the need to build ad-hoc distributional networks, to
acquire speciﬁc information on destination markets, or to customize products, all the way to the mere
transportation of goods imply that ﬁxed and variable costs tend to be higher for exporters. Moreover
the time lag between production and actual realization of the corresponding revenues is, in general,
longer, and international sales contracts are usually more complex, riskier and less enforceable than
in domestic markets. Building upon these ideas, within the broad literature on ﬁrm heterogeneity and
micro-dynamics of international trade (see Bernard et al., 2011a, for a review), an increasing number
of theoretical and empirical papers has recently focused on the effects of ﬁnancing frictions on ﬁrms’
exporting activities. These works show that ﬁnancial constraints reduce ﬁrms’ ability to enter inter-
national markets and the volume of trade, and limit exporters’ product scope as well as the number of
trade partners.
In the present paper weextend thefocus of previousempirical analyses to considerboth theroleof
ﬁnancial frictions on the probability of product/country switching, i.e. of adding or dropping products
or destinations over time, as well as their impact on ﬁrms’ export prices. Exploiting detailed data on
cross-border transactions (i.e. at product/destination level) for a large and representative sample of
Italian manufacturing ﬁrms, the paper provides three distinct contributions.
First, we move beyond the static picture delivered by existing studies. Exploring product/country
switching, indeed, adds new insights on the role of ﬁnancial constraints within a dynamic framework
where ﬁrms potentially export multiple products to multiple countries and their proﬁtabilities evolve
over time. This exercise is in the spirit of recent advancements in heterogeneous ﬁrms trade the-
ory, which try to explain how and why ﬁrms rearrange their products and destinations portfolios (cfr.
Bernard et al., 2010b). The key feature of these models is that product and geographical diversi-
ﬁcation change over time in response to shocks to ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics (ability, productivity,
competences) and to product speciﬁc attributes (technology, demand for product characteristics), with
the latterpossiblyidiosyncraticalso across destinations. The roleof ﬁnancial frictions is notexplicitly
considered in these models. Simple economic intuition suggests, however, that ﬁnancing constraints
can clearly play a role, making ﬁrms more vulnerable to negativeshocks and preventing them to fully
catch the beneﬁts from positive shocks. Our empirical analysis sheds light on this question, so far
largely unexplored.
Second, this paper considers whether there is any relationship between ﬁnancing constraints and
export pricing. Recently, the empirical works on ﬁrm heterogeneity in international trade have doc-
umented the systematic variation in export prices across ﬁrms, products and trade partners (Bastos
and Silva, 2010; Manova and Zhang, 2012; Harrigan et al., 2011). None of these works explores the
relation between ﬁnancial frictions and export prices. The only exception is Manova et al. (2011),
who however focus on sectoral rather than on ﬁrm-level constraints, and ﬁnd that Chinese afﬁliates to
multinationalcorporations set lower export prices in ﬁnancially vulnerable sectors, while the opposite
seems true for joint ventures with foreign ownerships. Further, in that work the issue of ﬁnancial con-
straints is tackled onlyin lightof thedebate on the relativemerits ofefﬁciency sortingmodels (Melitz,
2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) as compared to models with quality sorting (Verhoogen, 2008;
Kneller and Yu, 2008; Kugler and Verhoogen, 2011). In these two frameworks the predictions on
pricing and ﬁnancial constraints are different. Since it does not seem likely that constrained ﬁrms can
afford the additional costs of quality, related to new ﬁxed costs or to the purchase of higher quality
inputs, one expects them to export lower quality goods at lower prices, as compared to unconstrained
ﬁrms. Productivity-driven selection would suggest the opposite: to the extent that constrained ﬁrms
are also less productive, they operate at higher marginal costs, and thus are expected to set higher
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In both quality or efﬁciency sorting models, however, prices are not explicitly modeled as a strate-
gic variable that ﬁrms directly manipulate. Even when mark-ups are endogenous in the models, ﬁrm
prices vary across destinations in relation to factors outside direct control of the ﬁrm (strength of
competition and other destination country characteristics). In contrast, models developed outside the
international trade literature show that prices represent an important strategic variable per se under
ﬁnancing problems. Constrained ﬁrms have indeed an apparent incentive to raise short term revenues
in order to sustain cash ﬂow, to provide enough guarantees to creditors, as a way to ultimately re-
lax the constraints (among others, cfr. Dasgupta and Titman, 1998; Pichler et al., 2008). To achieve
higher revenues, ﬁrms can either try to attract additional demand via price cuts, or to raise the price
per unit sold. The latter strategy seems more likely to work in the short-run as it does not require to
expand production and to face the related additional costs. On the other hand, an increase of prices
is likely to increase revenues only if the demand is sufﬁciently rigid in the short run, and only to
the extent that customers adapt slowly to price changes. This idea underlies customer market mod-
els (Phelps and Winter, 1991; Lundin et al., 2009), which have attracted some interest in the study of
export prices under ﬁnancial constraints at the macroeconomic level (Gottfries, 2002). Similarly, one
might explicitly assume that the adjustment costs for changing quantities are high, while prices can be
varied more ﬂexibly (Gagnon, 1989). In other circumstances, however, a price war might be a more
attractive option. Which effect dominates the other, and thus which interpretation is more reasonable,
is an open empirical question that we investigate in the paper.
Finally, thispaper presentsalso methodologicalimprovementsregardingthechoiceof thevariable
used to measure ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial status and the econometric approach implemented in the analyses.
With respect to the measure of credit rationing, our contribution builds upon the intuition that the
availability and the cost of external resources depend on many factors, which do not simply map
one-to-one with productivity. Indeed, credit institutions make an overall assessment of ﬁrms’ abil-
ity to repay loans, looking at their ability to generate proﬁts, digging into their ﬁnancial structures
and in their past history as debtors. Moreover, ﬁnancing problems can also arise for otherwise well
performing ﬁrms, as an effective screening of the different credit seekers is often severely limited by
substantial informational imperfections characterizing credit markets. Also, investors’ maybe unwill-
ing to take high perceived risk, especially when economic conditions are very uncertain. In keeping
with recent research in industrial organization (see Bottazzi et al., 2010), we bring these consider-
ations to the empirical analysis by measuring ﬁnancing constraints through an ofﬁcial credit rating
issued by an independent institution and available for all the ﬁrms in the dataset. Compared to other
proxy of ﬁnancing constraints, either based on balance sheets variables or surveys, credit ratings in-
corporate the credit markets’ view on the creditworthiness of a ﬁrm, thus getting close to the actual
way investors’ decide to provide external ﬁnance. The speciﬁc rating index that we use is relied upon
by banks, and is tightly linked with availability and cost of credit. A similar approach is followed
in Muuls (2008)’s study of ﬁnancial constraints to export of Belgian ﬁrms.
Concerning the econometric approach, there are two well known potential sources of bias that one
needs to tackle when dealing with ﬁnancial constrained and exporting ﬁrms. A ﬁrst issue concerns
self-selection into export, as hidden factors affecting ﬁrms decision to enter foreign markets can be
correlated with unobserved factors inﬂuencing export performance (export values, number of prod-
ucts and destinations, quantity and prices across products and destinations). Second, an endogeneity
problem can arise from potential joint determination of export performance and availability of ﬁnan-
cial resources: although export performance does not enter the rating scores that we use to proxy
for ﬁnancial constraints, factors inﬂuencing credit conditions might also inﬂuence export activities.
Among previous empirical studies on ﬁnancial constraints to export, only Minetti and Zhu (2011) ad-
dress both issues. They employ a modiﬁed Heckman-type procedure to address selection, and exploit
exogenous variation in the provincial supply of banking services to ﬁnd appropriate instruments for
their proxy of credit constraints (followingGuiso et al., 2004). Though, their analysisdoes not control
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In this paper we account for both selection and endogeneity within the framework developed
in Semykina and Wooldridge (2010). A key advantage of the methodologies employed is that we can
allow for arbitrary correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and regressors in both the selection
and primary equations, thus fully exploiting the panel dimension of the data. We include diverse
sources of unobserved heterogeneity, at ﬁrm, product or destination level, or combinations of the
former, depending on the empirical speciﬁcation. At the same time, the methods are constructed to
allow for standard instrumental variable treatment of potentially endogenous variables.
The paper is organized as follows. Related literature is brieﬂy reviewed in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3 we present the data, our proxy of ﬁnancing constraints and the other main variables. Section 4
describes the econometric strategy that we adopt, with speciﬁc attention to sample selection and en-
dogeneity. Section 5 presents the evidence on how ﬁnancing constraints associate with ﬁrm level
intensive margin and product/country extensive margins. Section 6 reports results on the impact of
ﬁnancing constraints on product/country switching. In Section 7 we focus on the analysis of ﬁnancing
constraints and transaction level pricing decisions. We then conclude in Section 8.
2 Related literature
In exploring the relationship between ﬁrm level ﬁnancing constraints and export activities, this work
relates to a rather small subset of theoretical and empirical studies within the broad literature of ﬁrm
heterogeneity in international trade.
From the theoretical side, all the existing models incorporate ﬁnancing problems within the stan-
dard framework proposed in Melitz (2003). The common underlying intuition is that ﬁrms may fall
short of the additional ﬁnance needed to sustain export activities. Such shortage of ﬁnancial resources
may come from different channels. Chaney (2005) stresses an internal channel by modeling the ef-
fects on export activity of exogenous shocks to ﬁrms liquidity. The model developed in Manova
(2006, 2011) assumes instead that international activities are fully ﬁnanced via external capital and
ﬁnancing constraints arise from imperfect contractibility of ﬁnancial contracts: ﬁrms productivity is
observed by investors and must be high enough to meet their participation constraint. Muuls (2008)
borrows from both approaches to propose a model featuring three sources of constraints: shortage
of internal ﬁnance (due to low productivity), exogenous shocks to liquidity and imperfect access to
external credit. Feenstra et al. (2011) introduce also an informational asymmetry where banks do not
observe ﬁrms productivities. Despite their differences, all these models share a common mechanism
where ﬁnancing problems reinforce selection into export of more productive ﬁrms. The prediction is
therefore that constrained ﬁrms are less likely to enter foreign markets and, conditional on entry, they
export sub-optimal volumes. In this context, it is not difﬁcult to envisage extensions (cfr. the models
without ﬁnancial frictions proposed by Chaney, 2008; Bernard et al., 2011b) where a similarly dis-
torting mechanisms works also along the product/country extensive margins: with product-speciﬁc
or destination-speciﬁc trade costs constrained ﬁrms export less products and serve less countries
(Manova, 2006, 2011).
The available empirical evidence tend to corroborate these predictions. A considerably large body
of studies exploit ﬁrm level data. At this level, most works ﬁnd that ﬁnancing constraints affect both
the extensive and the intensive margin. Consistent results are presented in Muuls (2008) for Belgium,
in Bellone et al. (2010) for France, in Minetti and Zhu (2011) for a cross-section of Italian ﬁrms, and
in Li and Yu (2009) and Manova et al. (2011) for Chinese ﬁrms. The only contrasting evidence is
in Greenaway et al. (2007) for UK, where the probability of entry into exporting is not affected by
ﬁnancing problems, and in Berman and Hricourt (2010), where ﬁnancing problems do not inﬂuence
export values in a sample of nine developing countries.
The role of ﬁnancing constraints at the product/destination level is much less investigated. Muuls
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menting that ﬁrms with easier access to ﬁnance are more likely to expand the number of destinations
they serve. Similarly, Askenazy et al. (2011) conﬁrm that better ﬁnancial conditions are positively
associated with expansion and survival in export markets. Manova et al. (2011), despite measuring
sectoral rather than ﬁrm-level dependence on external ﬁnance, show that limited access to outside
capital restricts both the number of destinations served and the range of products exported.
3 Data and measurement
The analysis draws upon different sources of data, combining information on export transaction ﬂows
and ﬁrms’characteristics. In thissectionwedescribethedata, deﬁneourproxyofﬁnancial constraints
and present the other main variables exploited in the empirical exercises. Details on econometric
speciﬁcation and strategy are in Section4.
Data and sample
The analysis combines three sources of data: the Italian Foreign Trade Statistics (COE), the Italian
Register of Active Firms (ASIA) and a ﬁrm level accounting dataset (CEBI-CERVED). The ﬁrst two
datasets are collected by the Italian Statistical Ofﬁce (ISTAT), while the latter is available through
ISTAT but collected by the Italian Company Account Data Service (CADS).1
The COE dataset is the ofﬁcial source for trade ﬂows of Italy. It records separately the f.o.b. value
(in Euros) and the quantity (in kilos) involved in each export and import cross-border transaction
performed by a ﬁrm allowing to compute export and import prices (unit values). Traded products
are classiﬁed at the six digit level of the Harmonized System (HS6), for a total of 5 329 product
categories. Moreover, 236 different destinationcountries are covered in the sampleperiod 2000-2003.
The ASIA register covers the universe of Italian ﬁrms active in the same time span, irrespectively
of their export status. It reports annual ﬁgures on number of employees, sector of main activity,
and information about geographical location of the ﬁrms (municipality of principal activity or legal
address). Total sales are available only in 2000 and 2003.
The CEBI-CERVED-CADS dataset collects annual reports for all Italian limited liability ﬁrms.
Centrale dei Bilanci (CEBI) was founded as ajointagency ofthe Bank ofItaly and theItalian Banking
Association in the early 1980s to assist in supervising risk exposure of the Italian banking system.
Today part of CERVED, the leading group in business information services in Italy, CEBI was a
private company during the sample period, owned by major Italian banks which exploited its services
in gathering and sharing information about ﬁrms. The long term institutional role of CEBI ensures
high data quality, substantially limiting measurement errors.
The sample exploited merges the three data sources and virtually covers the entire population of
Italian limited ﬁrms (exporters and non exporters), active in manufacturing over the years 2000-2003.
The panel is open and includes a total of 149 414 ﬁrms. The representativeness with respect to the
whole Italian manufacturing is quite satisfactory, with only a very mild over-representation of bigger
and more productive ﬁrms: although about 20% of the total number of Italian manufacturing ﬁrms
is included, we cover about 60% of all exporting ﬁrms and about 84% of the total value of exports.
Further details are reported in Appendix A.
1The datasets have been made available for work after careful screening to avoid disclosure of individual information.
The data were accessed at the ISTAT facilities in Rome.
5Financing constraints
Our measure of ﬁnancing constraints is based on the credit rating index available through the CEBI-
CERVED-CADS dataset. In fact, credit ratings enjoy those features which are considered as crucial
for a good measure of ﬁnancial constraints (Cleary, 1999; Lamont et al., 2001). First, credit ratings
usually result from a multivariate score, thus summarizing a wide range of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial and non-
ﬁnancial characteristics. Second, they vary over time, thus allowing for the identiﬁcation of time
effects. Third, and more generally, credit ratings represents “the opinion [of the markets] on the future
obligor’s capacity to meet its ﬁnancial obligations”(Crouhy et al., 2001), thus capturing the actual
propensity of investors to grant credit. While these features are common to CEBI ratings and other
ratings issued by well known international agencies or other institutions, the ratings exploited in this
work also enjoy three speciﬁc advantages. Firstly, they give an assessment of the overall situation of
a ﬁrm, rather than judging the quality of a single liability of a company. Second, all the ﬁrms included
in the dataset receive a rating in every year, whereas international rating institutions typically rates a
much less representative sub-sample of ﬁrms. Third, our index is perceived as an ofﬁcial rating, due
to the long lasting relationship of CEBI with the Italian banking and credit systems. This motivates
the heavy reliance of banks on this speciﬁc rating index, and the tight link between the index and the
availability and cost of external ﬁnance: it is very unlikely that a ﬁrm with poor rating can receive
any credit (cfr. Pistaferri et al., 2010), and there is evidence that bad ratings have a strong association
with higher cost of credit (Panetta et al., 2009). Finally, and related, it is exactly a proxy of what
banks do, rather than a benchmark for potential lenders in general. This is particularly appropriate,
given the well known disproportionate dependence of the Italian industrial system on bank credit due
to underdevelopment of bond and stock markets in Italy as compared to other countries.
While the method to construct the rating index is proprietary information of CEBI, it is known
that information on ﬁrms’ international activities does not enter the score. However, other ﬁrm char-
acteristics which are likely to simultaneouslyaffect ﬁnancing problems and export performance, enter
the score. In the empirical analysis we thus include ﬁrm level controls that help separating ﬁnancial
constraints from other confounding factors. These are described below. Here we notice that previous
studies exploiting CEBI data ﬁnd that the rating index is highly correlated with banks’ internal deﬁni-
tion of default status (Bottazzi et al., 2011) and that an important fraction of highly productive, highly
proﬁtable and fast growing ﬁrms receive poor scores (Bottazzi et al., 2008, 2010). These results im-
ply that the index does not merely reﬂect ﬁrms’ performances, but actually captures a more complex
set of information that a bank would consider when lending to ﬁrms. In this respect, the motivation
behind using a rating index is in line with the similar exercise performed by Muuls (2008) on Belgian
exporters.
We exploit the information on credit ratings in the following way. The original index ranks ﬁrms
in 9 categories of creditworthiness: 1-high reliability, 2-reliability, 3-ample solvency, 4-solvency, 5-
vulnerability, 6-high vulnerability, 7-risk, 8-high risk, and 9-extremely high risk.2 In keeping with the
binary categorization traditionallyemployed in theliterature, we distinguishbetween Non Financially
Constrained (NFC) ﬁrms, rated from 1 to 7, and Financially Constrained (FC) ﬁrms, with rating 8 or
9. Accordingly, we build a FC dummy that takes value 1 if a ﬁrm is rated 8 or 9, and 0 otherwise.3
Firms can switch between the FC and the NFC class over the period, but the degree of persistence
is very high, also due to the short time window available. Finally notice that the index is updated at
the end of each year. It is therefore the rating in t − 1 that is relevant for credit suppliers’ present
2These deﬁnitions are valid over the sample time period. Changes in the deﬁnition and the number of score classes
occurred afterwards, following subsequent changes in CEBI ownership and updates in rating procedures.
3In exploratory exercises we broke down the sample in three categories, inserting an intermediate class of Mildly
Financially Constrained (MFC) ﬁrms, deﬁned as those rated 5 to 7. This attempt could in principle help to explore the
relationship between exportingactivities and differentdegrees of ﬁnancing constraints. However, the results for the group
of MFC ﬁrms did not displayed signiﬁcant differences as compared to NFC ﬁrms. This is in line with the results reported
in Bottazzi et al. (2010) in the context of size-growth dynamics of ﬁrms.
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Preliminary evidence on the unconditional correlation between ﬁnancing constraints and the dif-
ferent export performances that we investigate in this work are presented in Appendix B. First, ﬁ-
nancing constraints associate with a reduction in the level of foreign activities: as compared to NFC
ﬁrms, FC ﬁrms export less both overall and per transaction (about 40% less in value, and 35% less
in quantity, on average), ship less products (about 50% on average) and serve less countries (aver-
age 50% reduction). Second, ﬁnancing constraints associate with higher prices: f.o.b. unit values of
transactions performed by constrained ﬁrms are, on average, 25% higher.
Controls and Instruments
A further set of variables are employed in the paper. Firm level controls are intended to separate
out from the rating index some of the factors that inﬂuence both credit conditions and exporting
activities. Based on standard results in the literature, the following variables are selected. First,
given the well established result that smaller and younger ﬁrms tend to be more prone to ﬁnancing
problems (Cabral and Mata, 2003; Angelini and Generale, 2008), it is important to control for size
and age of the ﬁrms. We use the number of employees (Empl) as a proxy for ﬁrm size, and compute
age (Age) by year of foundation. Secondly, one needs to control for ﬁnancial factors that may interact
with external ﬁnancing constraints in determining the overall amount of ﬁnancial resources available
to a ﬁrm. In keeping with the vast literature on ﬁnancing constraints and ﬁrm dynamics (cfr. for
instance Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan and Zingales, 2000; Almeida et al., 2004), and with models of
ﬁnancing constraints to export, a key dimension is represented by the amount of internally generated
resources. Firms’ able to generate more internal funds are less likely to need external ﬁnance, and
also more likely to obtain larger and less expensivecredit lines. Among several alternatives suggested
in previous studies, we proxy internal resources with the Gross Operating Margin (GOM, equivalent
to the EBIDTA). This allows to focus on the resources originated from the mere operational activities
of a ﬁrm, at the same time getting rid of confounding factors related to external debt service, taxation
and amortization policies. A further important control variable concerns availability of collateral.
Contractual guarantees on some of the assets of a ﬁrm are often required by potential lenders or
sometimes even by the law as a pre-condition which can ease the access to and reduce the cost of
external ﬁnancing. The stock of Total Assets is used as a proxy for collateral (Assets).4
While controls indirectly help in mitigating possible endogeneity of the FC classiﬁcation, we also
construct a set of instrumental variables. As in Minetti and Zhu (2011), we follow Guiso et al. (2004)
and exploittheexogenousvariationinlocalcreditsupplydeterminedbytheprogressiveremovalinthe
1990s of therestrictionsin banking services supplyintroduced in 1936 by theBank of Italy. As shown
in that study, the geographical distribution of banks and branches in 1936 across Italian provinces
came about as the response to the norms enacted by the regulatory authority, while unrelated with the
structural characteristics and the level of development of the province itself. The subsequent removal
of the regulation during the 1990s impacted on banks’ possibility to open new afﬁliates is expected
to directly affect the availability of credit but not directly impact on export behavior. In this spirit,
we build three instruments that capture the degree of constrictiveness of the legislation as well as the
shock induced by its removal, at the provincial level: (1) number of saving banks and (2) number of
cooperative banks per 1000 inhabitants in 1936; (3) number of branches created annually by banks,
per 1000 inhabitants and imputed as the average in 1990-1998.5
4All the nominal variables are deﬂated with appropriatesectoral price indexes collected by the Italian statistical ofﬁce.
Complete deﬂator series are available only at the 2-digit level. We therefore perform deﬂation at this level of aggregation.
The base year is 2000.
5Minetti and Zhu (2011) are the ﬁrst to apply the approach in the empirical study of ﬁnancing constraints to export.
The methodologyhas howeveran extensive application in the empirical literature on Italy (see Herrera and Minetti, 2007;
Guiso et al., 2006; Alessandrini et al., 2010).
7In addition, we also consider a measure of ﬁxed costs of entry into foreign markets, providing the
exclusion restriction required by the procedures implemented to correct for potential selection bias.
This proxy is constructed starting from the concept of Local Labour Systems (LLSs). These are geo-
graphical areas deﬁned by the Italian Statistical Ofﬁce as an aggregation of municipalities according
to the degree of connectivity of labour market, and thus identifying local areas where production-
labour relationships are tight. Tight connections at the local level are likely characterized by activities
such as sharing same trade services, accessing pools of established distribution networks, exploiting
knowledge of neighbors’ experience in dealing with foreign contracts and foreign legislations. These
and possibly other factors all tend to facilitate the entry into export markets. Following Bernard and
Jensen (2004) and Bernard et al. (2010a), for each ﬁrm f, we deﬁne a proxy for (the inverse of) the
sunk cost of entry into exports (ExpCostf) computed as minimumbetween ﬁrm export entry and exit
rates in the LLS wherein a ﬁrm is located. A higher level of entry and exit indicates lower sunk costs
of exporting.6
4 Econometric procedures
This section provides details on the econometric procedures followed in our empirical analysis. As
mentioned, the techniques we use are primarily devised to tackle self-selection into export and poten-
tial endogeneity of ﬁnancing constraints.
We adopt two basic strategies, exploiting the different ﬁrm- or transaction- level information of
the data. Both strategies entail an application of the Heckman type 2-stage approach developed in
Semykina and Wooldridge (2010), which provides consistent estimation of panel data models with
selection controlling for heterogeneity also in presence of correlated unobserved effects and endoge-
nous regressors.
In a ﬁrst set of empirical investigations we explore to what extent ﬁnancing constraints affect
export margins using data at the ﬁrm level. The model includes two equations
lnYf t = γ1FCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FE1f + ǫ1f t (1)




f t + δtWf t−1 + FE2f + ǫ2f t > 0
￿
  (2)
Equation (1) is the equation of interest, where the dependent variable Yf t is the export perfor-
mance of ﬁrm f at time t along the different margins (the value of foreign sales, the number of
exported products or the number of destination countries) and FCf t−1 is our potentially endogenous
dummy for constrained ﬁrms. The set Zf t−1 includes ﬁrm-level controls (Empl, Age, Assets and
GOM) all in logs. With the only exception of Age which is taken at time t, all variables are measured
at year t − 1, thus reducing simultaneity problems.7 Further, FE1f is a ﬁrm ﬁxed effect possibly
correlated with the other regressors, and ǫ1f t is a standard error term. Equation (2) is a Probit selec-
tion equation, where sft is a binary indicator for ﬁrms’ export status (1 if a ﬁrm is exporter in t, 0
otherwise), 1[·] is the indicator function, IV FC
f t is an instrumental variable for FCf t, Wf t−1 is a set
of exogenous explanatory variables, FE2f is an unobserved ﬁrm ﬁxed effect, and ǫ2f t a usual error
term. Note that Zf ⊂ Wf, since Wf includes ﬁrm-level controls and also the proxy of sunk cost of
exports, ExpCostf, as the exclusion restriction variable.
The parameter of main interest is γ1, which captures differences in export performance due to
ﬁnancial constraints. Because of the presence of unobserved effects also in the selection equation (2),
adding the inverse Mills ratio and simply using Fixed Effects does not produce consistent estimates
of equation (1). However, a solution is available via adding time averages of all the exogenous
6We use the ISTAT deﬁnition of LLS in 2001, amounting to 683 locations.
7As a matter of compact notation, we use the subscript t − 1 for the set of controls, bearing however in mind that Age
is measured at time t.
8explanatory variables both in the main equation (controls and instruments for FC) and in the selection
equation (controls, ExpCostf and the instruments for FC).8
A consistent estimate of γ1 is obtained with the following procedure:
Procedure 4.1
1. generate the instrument IV FC
f t as the ﬁtted probability from a Probit regression of our binary
indicator FC on the controls in Zf and on the 3 provincial level instruments for credit condi-
tions: (1) number of saving banks and (2) number of cooperative banks per 1000 inhabitants in
1936, and (3) number of branchescreated annuallybybanks, per 1000 inhabitantsand imputed
as the average in 1990-1998;9
2. for each t, obtain the inverse Mills ratio ˆ λf t from a Probit estimate of equation (2) augmented
with the time averages of the instrument IV FC
f t and time averages of the controls in Wf;
3. estimate via pooled 2SLS equation (1) augmented with the time averages of the generated in-
strument IV FC
f t , with the time averages of the explanatories in Zf, and with the inverse Mills
ratio ˆ λf t obtained in Step 2 together with its interactions with time dummies; use Zf, IV FC
f t ,
all the time averages and ˆ λf t as instruments;
4. use a “panel bootstrap”, sampling across sectional units, to obtain asymptotic standard errors
corrected for problems related to general heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and generated
regressors.10
In a second set of exercises we exploit the transaction level disaggregation of the data to explore
the role of ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrms’ switching among products and destinations, and on their
pricing strategies. The methodology is quite similar to the procedure employed above. However, the
more detailed information available allows to model selection into export as the outcome of a Tobit
regression. The advantage is that, in this case, there is no need for an exclusion restriction, since
the variation in the dependent variable in the Tobit is used to identify the parameters in the main
equation. Moreover a pure Fixed Effects approach is allowed and more appropriate in estimating the
main equation.
In general terms, the model still consists of two equations
Y· t = γ1FCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FE1 · + ǫ1 · t (3)




f t + δZf t−1 + FE2 · + ǫ2fpc t
￿
  (4)
where a “·” in the subscript indicates that the variables can be taken at different combination of ﬁrm
f, product p and destination country c level depending on the precise speciﬁcation we intend to esti-
mate. In the primary equation the dependent variable of interest (the probability of dropping products
or destinations or the log of unit values) is regressed against the FC dummy, the ﬁrm level controls
8More precisely, we are modeling FE2f = ξ ¯ IV
FC
f + ¯ Wfξ + a2f, where a bar indicates time averages of a variable,
and modeling a2f|IV FC
f  Wf ∼ Normal(0 σ2
a). This is equivalent to assume that FE2f is related to IV FC
f and to Wf
only through their time averages, while the remainder is independent of IV FC
f and Wf. Likewise, the other implicit
assumption is that the main equation unobserved effect is modeled as FE1f = η ¯ FCf + ¯ Zfη + a1f. This transfor-
mation, similar in spirit to ﬁxed effects estimator discussed in Mundlak (1978), uses time averages of the explanatories
computed over the entire sample of exporters and non-exporters and it is therefore free of selection bias (see Semykina
and Wooldridge, 2010, for details).
9This follows the Procedure 19.2 in Wooldridge (2010)
10This is suggested in Semykina and Wooldridge (2010) as an alternative to analytical computation of sandwich stan-
darderrors. Throughoutthepaper,we alwaysreportbootstrappedstandarderrors. Nonetheless,wecheckedwhenpossible
that the two alternatives give very close estimates of standard errors.
9Zf and a set of ﬁxed effect FE1 controlling for diverse sources of unobserved factors. The selection
equation is a Tobit on the (log of the) value of export, ExpV al, with explanatory variables given by
the generated instruments IV FC
f t , the ﬁrm-level controls and a ﬁxed effect capturing the same type of
unobserved heterogeneity modeled in the primary equation. Notice that in this equation, as in Proce-
dure 4.1 above, the ﬁxed effects are inserted by adding the time averages of the proper explanatory
variables. As we control for country-level ﬁxed effects in some speciﬁcations, the selection equa-
tion, when appropriate, will be also augmented with a set of standard gravity-like destination country
characteristics, Zc, including market size, consumer income and an iceberg trade costs.11
Consistent estimates are obtained through the following procedure
Procedure 4.2
1. build the instrument IV FC
f t as in Procedure 4.1;
2. for each t, obtain the residuals from a Tobit estimate of equation (4) augmented with the time
averages of IV FC
f t , and the time averages of ﬁrm-level and/or country-level controls, depending
on the type of ﬁxed effects chosen for the main equation (3);12
3. estimate via pooled 2SLS equation (3) with appropriateﬁxed effects, augmented with the gener-
ated instrument IV FC
f t and with the residuals obtained in Step 2 together with their interactions
with timedummies; useIV FC
f t , ﬁrm-level and/orcountry-level controls,and theStep 2 residuals
as instruments;
4. use a “panel bootstrap”, sampling across sectional units, to obtain asymptotic standard errors
corrected for problems related to general heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and generated
regressors.
Some of our empirical analyses on the relation between ﬁnancing constraints on ﬁrms’ perfor-
mance in international markets are not new per se. However, previous studies, even when addressing
selection and endogeneity, do not control for unobserved heterogeneity both in the selection and pri-
mary equation. The methodologies we adopt give additional conﬁdence of proper identiﬁcation of
the key parameters. For completeness and comparison with previous ﬁndings, the following Sections
also reports more standard estimates (OLS, Probit or Fixed Effects) of the main equations of interest.
5 Financing constraints and ﬁrm export margins
This section explores how ﬁnancing constraints relate with export values, number of exported prod-
ucts and number of destination countries at the ﬁrm level. Most of previous empirical studies have
focussed on similar regressions. We improve the conﬁdence in the estimates by fully controlling
unobserved heterogeneity, self-selection and potential endogenity of our variable of interest.
We start by exploring the relation between ﬁnancing constraints and the (log of the) value of ﬁrm
level exports (Exports). The equation of interest is
Exportsf t = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEf + ǫf t (5)
11We measure these variables by GDP, GDP per capita (GDPPC) and bilateral geographical distance (DIST). Data
on GDP and GDP per capita are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators (nominal ﬁgures). Distance of
destinationcountriesfromItalyis computedviathegreatcirclemethod(MayerandZignago,2005)ontheCEPIIdatabase.
12This involves inﬂating the dataset with lots of zeros, corresponding to the products/destinations potentially available
but not exported by a ﬁrm. This enormously increases the data dimension, rapidly exceeding reasonable computational
limits. Our solution is either to drop some relatively unimportant product/destination pairs, or to compute estimates via
resampling. Details are reported in the proper sections and in Appendix A.S.
10Table 1: Within-Firm Financial Constraints and Total Exports
lnExportsf t lnExportsf t lnExportsf t lnExportsf t
POLS FE Procedure 4.1⋆ Procedure 4.1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FCf t−1 -0.227*** -0.091*** -0.061** -0.476*
(0.028) (0.028) (0.026) (0.270)
lnEmplf t−1 0.211*** 0.130*** 0.033* 0.019
(0.012) (0.020) (0.017) (0.021)
lnAgef t -0.116*** -0.037 0.462*** 0.246**
(0.012) (0.076) (0.089) (0.098)
lnASSETSf t−1 0.943*** 0.515*** 0.475*** 0.426***
(0.011) (0.031) (0.029) (0.031)
lnGOMf t−1 0.063*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.005
(0.0044) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
ˆ λf t 0.645*** 0.154*
(0.085) (0.091)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.443 0.911 0.400 0.403
N.Observations 123597 123597 123597 113225
N.Firms 53173 53173 53173 48776
Note: Table reports regression using data on 2001-2003. The dependent variable used is reported at the top of each column. FCf t−1 is a dummy
for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Column 1 includes sectoral and province ﬁxed effects. All the regressions include a constant term. Robust standard
errors clustered at ﬁrm level are reported in parenthesis below the coefﬁcients: in columns 3 and 4 these are computed out of 1000 bootstrap runs.
Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***:p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Procedure 4.1⋆ controls only selection by performing Procedure 4.1 without
instrumenting FCf t−1.
where FCf is our dummy variable identifying constrained ﬁrms, Zf is the set of ﬁrm level control
variables, and FEf is a ﬁrm ﬁxed effect capturing differences in ﬁrm export due to time invariant
ﬁrm speciﬁc characteristics. Identiﬁcation therefore comes from variation within ﬁrm over time.13
Columns1-2ofTable1reportpooledOLS(POLS)andFixedEffects(FE)estimates. Theseresults
already provide a clear picture: ﬁnancing constraints are signiﬁcantly associated with reduced export
values. The coefﬁcient of the FC dummy in the FE speciﬁcation is signiﬁcantly smaller in absolute
value than the OLS estimates. This suggests a negative correlation between omitted variables and
assignment to the FC class, as it is indeed expected for unmeasured factors such as managerial ability
or productivity, for instance.
In columns 4 we directly address selection and endogeneity bias via the Procedure 4.1 described
in Section 4. The term ˆ λf t is the inverse Mills ratio estimated in step 2 of the procedure: signiﬁcance
of the coefﬁcient on ˆ λf t conﬁrms that selection is indeed an issue. We shall also notice that the
relevance and the validity of the instrument for FC, i.e. the ﬁtted probabilities IV FC, is conﬁrmed
in the preliminary Probit from step 1 of the procedure, where we observe that the coefﬁcients on the
number of saving banks, on the number of cooperative banks per 1000 inhabitants in 1936, and on
th number of branches created annually by banks during the 1990s, are jointly statistically signiﬁcant
(χ2 = 13 97 with p − value < 0 002).14
The main message remain valid, though: ﬁrms with limited or no access to external ﬁnance export
signiﬁcantly less in value than unconstrained ﬁrms. The reduction is sizeable, as the estimated co-
13Here and in the following, negative values of GOM (corresponding to about 30% of the observations) are changed
into 1 before taking logs: within the context of our research, negative or zero operating revenues equivalently signal the
inability of ﬁrms to rely on internal resources and thus a strong need of outside capital.
14Notice that the construction of IV FC remains identical in all the analyses presented in the paper. Moreover, since
the number of provinces rise from 95 to 103 from 1936 to 2001, regressions only use the information for the 95 original
provinces.
11efﬁcient of −0 476 implies that constrained ﬁrms export about 38% less, ceteris paribus.15 This is a
smaller effect than the estimate obtained in Minetti and Zhu (2011) on a different, and smaller sample
of Italian ﬁrms. It is also remarkable that the negative effect is stronger than what we could conclude
from OLS or FE estimates. The latter turn upward biased (smaller coefﬁcients in absolute value),
suggesting that the endogenous component of our FC classiﬁcation produces an underestimation of
the true detrimental effect of being constrained on exporting activities.16 Concerning the controls, all
the estimation methods tend to agree that age and collateral display a stronger correlation, while the
elasticities of exports to size and internal resources reveal a second order role of these variables. In
fact, selection-endogeneity corrected estimates in Column 4 show that both age and collateral have a
positive association with exporting activity, while the other two controls are not signiﬁcant.
In unreported regressions (available upon request), we check the robustness of our results to al-
ternative speciﬁcations. The main results, revealing the negative impact of ﬁnancing problems on
export values remain consistently unchanged. The reduced exporting capacity of constrained ﬁrms
still appear when we add a measure of TFP among the controls, explicitly accounting for the key
role played by productivity in theoretical models of heterogeneous ﬁrms and trade. 17 Also, the main
results remain valid when we restrict the analysis to those ﬁrms which always export over the sample
period, and and also when we use export volumes in place of export values as the dependent variable.
Finally, we explore the relationship between ﬁnancing constraints and ﬁrms’ domestic sales: in line
with the theoretical predictions, we establish that ﬁnancing constraints reduce domestic sales much
less than they do for exports.
Oursecondexerciseinvestigatestheroleofﬁnancing constraintsalongtheproductand destination
margins. We replace the dependent variable in equation (5) with either the (log of the) number of
destinations served (#Countries) or the (log of the) number of exported products, aggregated at the
level of each ﬁrm. The primary equations are
#Countriesf t = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEf + ǫf t   (6)
and
#Productsf t = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEf + ǫf t (7)
while selection is still modeled as the export participation decision detailed above, with ﬁrm ﬁxed
effects and including ExpCost as the exclusion restriction variable.
Table 2 reports the results, again for POLS, FE with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects, and selection-endogeneity
corrected estimates from Procedure 4.1. The main ﬁnding is that ﬁnancing problems hamper the abil-
ity of ﬁrms to operate along both margins. The result does not vary much across different estimation
methods, although, similarly to the above regression on export values, the POLS and FE estimates
of the FC coefﬁcient are upward biased with respect to the more reliable selection-endogeneity cor-
rected estimates. Taking these estimates (in Column 4 and 8), we ﬁnd that ﬁnancing constraints
associate with a 27% reduction in the number of destination countries, and with a 26% reduction in
the number of exported products.18 Concerning the control variables, selection-endogeneity corrected
15This ﬁgure is obtained by exp(−0 476) − 1.
16Indeed,intheﬁrst stageofthe2SLSestimatesfromStep3oftheprocedure,theﬁttedprobabilitiesIV FC is positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with the FC dummy (coefﬁcient ∼ 1 149, S.E. 0 068), conﬁrming the upward bias in OLS
and FE estimates.
17As we do not have data on intermediate inputs and investment required by reliable estimation of production func-
tions (see Olley and Pakes, 1996; Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003), TFP is computed as the residual of a FE estimate of a 2
inputs production function, taking value added as a proxy for output, and employees and gross tangible assets to proxy
labour and capital inputs. Due to this limitation, after checking that the main results are not affected, we do not include
this control in the following analyses.
18The estimated coefﬁcient on IV FC in the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS are obviously identical to the above-mentioned
estimates of the export value regression. Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on ˆ λ conﬁrm that selection is an issue in the choice of
both the scope of export product variety and of the extent of geographical diversiﬁcation.
12Table 2: Within-Firm Financial Constraints and the Extensive Margins of Trade
#Countriesf t #Countriesf t #Countriesf t #Countriesf t #Productsf t #Productsf t #Productsf t #Productsf t
POLS FE Procedure 4.1⋆ Procedure 4.1 POLS FE Procedure 4.1⋆ Procedure 4.1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FCf t−1 -0.085*** -0.048*** -0.034*** -0.314** -0.086*** -0.045*** -0.031*** -0.302**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.121) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.120)
lnEmplf t−1 0.131*** 0.079*** 0.026*** 0.022** 0.078*** 0.065*** 0.024*** 0.018**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
lnAgef t 0.025*** 0.022 0.267*** 0.184*** -0.031*** -0.055 0.144*** 0.020
(0.007) (0.033) (0.043) (0.046) (0.006) (0.037) (0.043) (0.047)
lnASSETSf t−1 0.350*** 0.201*** 0.136*** 0.126*** 0.339*** 0.196*** 0.179*** 0.155***
(0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
lnGOMf t−1 0.029*** 0.005*** 0.004** -0.008 0.019*** 0.006*** 0.005*** -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
ˆ λf t−1 -0.066 -0.165*** 0.388*** 0.134***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.364 0.929 0.303 0.302 0.342 0.876 0.249 0.253
N.Observations 123597 123597 123597 113225 123597 123597 123597 113225
N.Firms 53173 53173 53173 48766 53173 53173 53173 48766
Note: Table reports regressions using data on 2001-2003. The dependent variable is reported at the top of each column. FCf t−1 is a dummy for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms. Columns 1 and 5 include sectoral and province ﬁxed
effects. All the regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors clustered at ﬁrm level are reported in parenthesis below the coefﬁcients: in columns 3-4 and 7-8 these are computed out of 1000 bootstrap runs. Asterisks
denote signiﬁcance levels (***:p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Procedure 4.1⋆ controls only selection by performing Procedure 4.1 without instrumenting FCf t−1.
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3estimates show that size, age and collateral tend to display a positive correlation with export activ-
ity, although the coefﬁcient on age is not signiﬁcant in the destination margin regression. We also
ﬁnd that internal resources do not play a role along the margins, once we account for selection and
endogeneity.
Summing up, the results of this section are consistent with theoretical predictions and with previ-
ous empirical studies. First, the evidence conﬁrms that constrained ﬁrms that enter foreign markets
export second best values thus lending support to the hypothesis that external funds are needed to
cover both ﬁxed and variable export costs. Second, our ﬁndings also support the existence of country-
speciﬁc and product-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs of exporting, as indeed FC ﬁrms export a narrower range of
products to a smaller number of countries as compared to unconstrained exporters.
6 Financing constraints and product/country switching
The analysis above explores the relationship between ﬁnancing constraints and the overall prod-
uct/destination extensive margins. In this section we take a dynamic perspective and investigate to
what extent ﬁrm-level ﬁnancing constraints play a role in the process of dropping or adding products
and destinations. These relations are rarely addressed in previous studies, and never investigated with
explicit controls for unobserved heterogeneity, selection and endogeneity.
Product-Country dropping
In examining dropping dynamics we exploit the ﬁrm-product and ﬁrm-destination dimensions of the
data, over time. We deﬁne two indicator variables of dropping. For product dropping, the indicator
DropPfpt takes value 1 if product p is exported by ﬁrm f at time t−1, but not exported in year t, and
0 otherwise. Symmetrically, for destination dropping we deﬁne the indicator DropCfct, that equals 1
if country c is served by ﬁrm f at time t − 1, but not served in year t, and 0 otherwise.
Then, we explore the impact of being constrained in one year on the subsequent year probability
of dropping products
Pr(DropPfpt = 1) = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEfp + ǫfpt (8)
or dropping destinations
Pr(DropCfct = 1) = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEfc + ǫfct   (9)
where Zf is our usual set of ﬁrm-level controls, and we also include ﬁrm-product or ﬁrm-country
ﬁxed effects, accounting for any time invariant ﬁrm-product or ﬁrm-destination characteristic that
may inﬂuence the decision to drop a product or a destination. Notice that the analysis only considers
those ﬁrms that do not drop all their products or withdraw from all the destinations in two consecutive
years (survivingﬁrms). This shall avoid confoundingfactors related to thelikely different motivations
behind the choice to completely exit from export markets.19
Columns 1-4 of Table 3 presents results of the product dropping equation. In column 1 we report
marginal effects of Probit estimates, ignoring ﬁxed effects. Then, in column 2, we follow Bernard
et al. (2010b) and estimate a linear probability model with ﬁrm-product ﬁxed effects, so that identiﬁ-
cation comes fromvariationwithinﬁrm and product, across timeand destinations. Finally, in columns
3-4 we address selection and endogeneity. Estimates are in this case obtained followingProcedure 4.2
19Results must be therefore interpreted as informative on dropping conditional on survival in export markets between
two consecutive years.
14Table 3: Product-Country dropping and ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints
Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms
DropPfpt DropPfpt DropPfpt DropPfpt DropCfct DropCfct DropCfct DropCfct
Probit FE Procedure 4.2⋆ Procedure 4.2 Probit FE Procedure 4.2⋆ Procedure 4.2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
FCf t−1 0.035*** 0.028** 0.036*** 0.415*** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.420***
(0.005) (0.013) (0.0004) (0.036) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.036)
lnEmplf t−1 -0.003 -0.024*** -0.045*** -0.037*** -0.014*** -0.037*** -0.057*** -0.051***
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
lnAgef t -0.002 0.168*** 0.213*** 0.241*** 0.004*** 0.158*** 0.064*** 0.081***
(0.001) (0.020) (0.008) (0.009) (0.001) (0.123) (0.012) (0.006)
lnASSETSf t−1 -0.013*** -0.097*** -0.112*** -0.105*** -0.013*** -0.079*** -0.108*** -0.093***
(0.002) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009) (0.003)
lnGOMf t−1 -0.005*** -0.001 -0.001* 0.009*** -0.010*** -0.002** -0.003*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ˆ ǫ2 0.001** -0.002*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Country-Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.004 0.528 0.539 0.018 0.558 0.561
N.Observations 1257193 1257193 1256899 680620 1414292 1414051 1414051 1414051
Note: Table reports regression using data on 2001-2003. The regression sample is ﬁrms that export at least one product or serve at least one destination in both t − 1 and t (Surviving ﬁrms). The dependent variable is a dummy
indicating a ﬁrm-product drop or ﬁrm-country drop between t − 1 and t. All the regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors clustered at ﬁrm level are reported in parenthesis below the coefﬁcients: in columns
3-4 and 7-8 these are computed out of 200 bootstrap runs. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***:p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%). Procedure 4.2⋆ controls only selection by performing Procedure 4.2 without instrumenting
FCf t−1.
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5presented in Section 4, with the Tobit selection equation involved in step 2 appropriately modiﬁed to
include ﬁrm-product ﬁxed effects.20
The ﬁndings across the different estimation methods agree in indicating that FC ﬁrms are more
likely to discard products. FE estimates reveal a downward bias in POLS estimates. This is consistent
with standard omitted variablebias, giventhe expected negativecorrelation between product drop and
unmeasured ﬁrm-product factors (ﬁrm abilityin aspeciﬁcproduct market, forinstance), and thelikely
negative correlation between these factors and being ﬁnancially constrained. The magnitude of the
effect of FCs is however severely underestimated if we do not control for selection and endogeneity.21
Taking the more robust estimates in Column 4, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancing constraints increase of 41 5
percentage points the probability of ﬁrm-product drop. Given an average drop rate of 42 7% among
unconstrained ﬁrms, this means that the probability of product dropping is about 97% higher for
constrained ﬁrms. Also, and quite intuitively, size and collateral reduce the probability to drop a
product: ﬁrms that are bigger and with more collateral are more likely to maintain their current
product portfolio, ceteris paribus. Age has instead a positive sign, which suggests that older ﬁrms
tend to discard more products, possibly due to higher frequency of products at later stages of their life
cycle among older ﬁrms. Also, availability of internal resources has a positive, although very limited
role.
Columns 5-8 of Table 3 then show the corresponding ﬁndings from the destination dropping equa-
tion (9). 22 In this case the main equation includes ﬁrm-country ﬁxed effects. In line with results on
product dropping, we ﬁnd that constrained ﬁrms have a signiﬁcantly higher probability to leave a des-
tination market. The main ﬁnding does not change if we estimate a Probit, a linear probability model,
or a selection-endogeneity corrected model. Taking corrected estimates in column 6, ﬁnancing con-
straints increase the probability of country dropping by 42 percentage points. Against an average drop
rate of 21 8% among unconstrained ﬁrms, this implies that the probability of country drop is almost
twice as big as that for constrained ﬁrms.23 Estimates on control variables almost perfectly reproduce
the results from the product dropping equation: size and collateral reduce country-dropping, while
age and GOM have a positive effect. As for the product dropping analysis, we perform a robustness
check where we also control for the number of countries served by a ﬁrm at t − 1. The coefﬁcient on
the FC dummy remains positive and signiﬁcant.
Product-Country adding
We next turn to explore if limited access to external ﬁnance inﬂuences ﬁrms’ decisions of adding
products or countries to their export portfolios. Differently from the dropping regressions, recording
the adding decisions at ﬁrm-product or ﬁrm-country level is unfeasible. Indeed, that would require to
create, for each ﬁrm, an observation for each product-country combination present in the dataset at
time t − 1 (even for transactions not actually performed by the ﬁrm), and then to see which of these
products or destinations are added at time t. This cannot be managed given the high number of ﬁrms,
products and destinations in the data. We therefore aggregate the information at the ﬁrm level and,
following Bernard et al. (2010b), we examine the probability that a current exporter adds at least a
new product or a new destination to its export portfolio between two consecutive years. We deﬁne an
indicator of product adding, AddPf t, that takes value 1 if at least one product which was not exported
by ﬁrm f at time t − 1 is exported at time t, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, we construct an indicator of
country adding, AddCf t, which equals 1 if at least one new destination is served by ﬁrm f at time t,
as compared to the set of countries served at time t − 1, and 0 otherwise.
20Details on how the dataset has been prepared to estimate equation 8 are in Appendix C.
21Estimated coefﬁcient on IV FC in the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS is 0 910 with a standard error of 0 023.
22See Appendix C for details on how the dataset has been prepared for the estimation.
23Estimated coefﬁcient on IV FC in the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS-IV is 0 710 with a standard error of 0 021.
16Table 4: Adding new Products-Country and ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial constraints
Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms Surviving ﬁrms
AddPf t AddPf t AddPf t AddCf t AddCf t AddCf t
Probit FE 2SLS-IV Probit FE 2SLS-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FCf t−1 -0.018*** -0.022** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.015** -0.018**
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
lnEmplf t−1 0.015*** -0.003 -0.002 0.017*** -0.006* -0.005*
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
lnAgef t -0.024*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.023*** -0.022***
0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
lnASSETSf t−1 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.061*** 0.024*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
lnGOMf t−1 0.004*** 0.002 0.002** 0.004*** -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Product-Mix*Year FE No Yes Yes
Country-Mix*Year FE No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.035 0.091 0.010 0.062 0.182
N.Observations 110425 110425 98374 110425 110425 88021
N.Firms 45722 45722 41860 45722 45722 41789
Note: Table reports regression using data on 2001-2003. The regression sample is ﬁrms that export at least one product or serve at least one destination
in both t − 1 and t (surviving ﬁrms). The dependent variable is a dummy indicating a ﬁrm adding at least a new product or a new destination country
between t − 1 and t. All the regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors clustered at product-mix or country-mix level are reported in
parenthesis below the coefﬁcients. Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***:p<1%; **: p<5%; *: p<10%).
The equations of interest are
Pr(AddPf t = 1) = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEp−mix × t + ǫf t (10)
for product adding, and
Pr(AddCf t = 1) = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEc−mix × t + ǫf t (11)
for country adding, where FC is the usual indicator of constrained ﬁrms and Zf the usual set of ﬁrm
characteristics. We also include product-mix or country-mix ﬁxed effects (FEp−mix and FEc−mix),
interacted with year ﬁxed effects, controlling for common characteristics of those ﬁrms that export
the same bundle of products or serve the same geographical area in the initial year t − 1.24
Since selection does not represent an issue, as indeed adding new markets is equivalent to the
entry decision itself, the two equations are estimated via a simple Probit, ignoring ﬁxed effects, and
via a linear probability model with appropriate ﬁxed effects. In this second case, we also employ
a standard 2SLS-IV estimator to correct for endogeneity of the FC dummy, with usual instrument
given by the ﬁtted probabilities IV FC. Symmetrically to the dropping analysis, the regressions are
performed on the sub-sample of ﬁrms who export at least one product or are active in at least one
country in t − 1 (surviving ﬁrms). This helps to get rid of confounding factors behind a ﬁrm’s choice
to start exporting for the ﬁrst time.
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 show the results for product adding. The three speciﬁcations provide
a consistent picture: constrained ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly less likely to add new products than uncon-
strained ﬁrms. Endogeneity-corrected estimates show that the probability of observing a constrained
ﬁrm that adds at least one product is 2 9% lower than for an unconstrained ﬁrm (2 4 percentage points
less compared to an average add rate of 84% among unconstrained ﬁrms).25 Concerning the controls,
we ﬁnd a negative and strongly signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on age. Paired with the ﬁnding that age in-
creases the probability to drop products, this results tends to conﬁrm that older ﬁrms are relatively
24More precisely, product-mixes are deﬁned as the main sections of the HS classiﬁcation. Country-mixes are based
on aggregation of countries into geographical areas following the geo-economic classiﬁcation provided by the European
Commission (see http://www.coeweb.istat.it/english/default.htm). The US, Canada, Japan, Brazil, India, China and major
European countries are each treated as independent geographical destinations, given their obvious importance.
25Estimated coefﬁcient on IV FC in the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS-IV is 1 409 with a standard error of 0 047.
17more involved in exporting more mature products, and thus less likely to switch to new product mar-
kets. Availabilityof collateral has the expected positivesign, with magnitudecomparable to the effect
of age. Internal resources also have a positive, although much weaker association. The coefﬁcient on
size is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The results for country adding are then presented in columns 4-6. The ﬁndings ﬁt well with the
picture emerged from product adding regressions. We still observe a negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁ-
cient on the FC dummy: problems to access external ﬁnance signiﬁcantly reduce the ability to widen
geographical diversiﬁcation. According to the endogeneity-corrected estimates, constrained ﬁrms
have a 2 3% lower probability to add at least one destination (1 8 percentage points lower compared
to an average add rate of 78% among unconstrained ﬁrms).26 The other controls display coefﬁcients
quite close to those observed for product adding. The more sizeable coefﬁcients are found for age and
for the availability of collateral, which respectively decrease and increase the likelihood to serve new
countries. Size and internal resources have a second order relevance, with coefﬁcients only barely
signiﬁcant or not signiﬁcant at all. In unreported regressions (available upon request), we have con-
ﬁrmed that the results are robust to an explicit control for either the number of products exported or
the number of countries served in the initial year.
Altogether, the ﬁndings of this section emphasize ﬁnancial constraints as a relevant factor, pre-
viously unexplored, in explaining the process of within-ﬁrm selection of products and destinations.
More speciﬁcally, and read in view of recent attempts to model such processes (cf. Bernard et al.,
2010b), the results support that constrained ﬁrms beneﬁt from positiveshocks less than unconstrained
ﬁrms, and thus have a reduced probability to add markets, while they are at the same time also more
sensitive to adverse shocks, and thus drop more frequently.
7 Financing constraints and export prices
We now turn to explore the association of ﬁnancing constraints with export prices exploting our
dataset at the transaction level. Labeling with UVfpc the (log of the) unit value of export by ﬁrm f in
product p to country c, we estimate the model
UVfpc t = γFCf t−1 + βZf t−1 + FEpc + ǫfpc t   (12)
where FCf is the usual dummy for constrained ﬁrms, Zf the usual set of ﬁrm-level controls, and we
also includeproduct-country ﬁxed effects, FEpc. This greatly helps identiﬁcation, as it indeed implies
that we ask whether ﬁnancing constraints inﬂuence price variation across ﬁrms performing the same
product-country transactions.
In Table 5 we report simple FE estimates, and control for selection and endogeneity bias via the
Procedure 4.2 described in Section 4.27
FE estimates reveal that, conditional on other factors, constrained ﬁrms charge higher prices (an
increase of 9 4%) than unconstrained ﬁrms. The elasticity of size is positive and signiﬁcant, while
availability of collateral associates with lower prices. Age and operational proﬁts do not play any
statistically signiﬁcant role. The results are conﬁrmed when we control for selection and endogeneity
bias. However, the estimates in column 3 reveal a downward bias in the FE results: the corrected
coefﬁcient on the FC dummy implies that constrained ﬁrms set export prices about 74% higher as
compared to unconstrained ﬁrms.
Combined with the ﬁndings on reduced export activities emerged from the ﬁrm-level analysis of
export margins, the observed pricing behavior of constrained ﬁrms is open to different interpretations.
26Estimated coefﬁcient on IV FC in the ﬁrst stage of the 2SLS-IV is 1 321 with a standard error of 0 042.
27Moreover due to the too heavy computational power required by the amount of data, the estimates are obtained
through the Procedure C.2 described in Appendix C.
18Table 5: Financial constraints and price setting at transaction level
lnUVfpct lnUVfpct lnUVfpct lnUV Impfpct
FE Procedure 4.2⋆ Procedure 4.2 FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FCf t−1 0.094*** 0.102 *** 0.740 ** 0.022
(0.033) (0.040) (0.269) (0.020)
lnEmplf t−1 0.060*** 0.062 *** 0.064 *** 0.039***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.006)
lnAgef t -0.005 -0.005 0.019 0.010
(0.009) (0.014) (0.019) (0.006)
lnASSETSf t−1 -0.048*** -0.055 *** -0.079 *** 0.009
(0.009) (0.013) (0.016) (0.006)
lnGOMf t−1 -0.004 -0.004 0.018 -0.006**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.003)




Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes





Note: Table reports regression using data on 2001-2003. The dependent variable is reported at the top of each column. All the regressions include
a constant term. Robust standard errors clustered at ﬁrm level are reported in parenthesis below the coefﬁcients. estimates in columns 2-3 are com-
puted with the Procedure C.2 with 100 replications (cfr. Appendix C for details). Asterisks denote signiﬁcance levels (***:p<1%; **: p<5%; *:
p<10%).Procedure 4.2⋆ controls only selection by performing Procedure 4.2 without instrumenting FCf t−1.
Lower export values with higher prices are consistent with a pure efﬁciency sorting interpretation,
where FC ﬁrms set higher prices because they operate at lower efﬁciency (i.e. at higher marginal
cost). Also, the ﬁndings may be in line with a strategic pricing explanations, with constrained ﬁrms
that raise prices in the attempt to offset the negativeimpact on revenues due to reduced export activity,
at leastpartially exploitingdemandrigidities. Theresultsare instead difﬁcultto reconcilewithmodels
of quality sorting in export, which would predict that constrained ﬁrms reduce both quantities and
prices as compared to unconstrained ﬁrms. Since export prices only represent an indirect signal of
quality, however, we also complement the analysis to check if ﬁrms that set higher export prices also
purchase more costly inputs. While the price of inputs is not usually available in standard industrial
data, we can exploit the transaction level prices of imports in intermediate goods, and use the latter to
proxy for the overall input prices. We run the following regression
lnUV Impfpct = γFCf t−1 + δAvg lnUVf t + βZf t−1 + FEpc + ǫfpct (13)
where we consider the unit value of import in product p from origin country c, UV Imp, only for
those transactions in products that fall into the intermediate input category identiﬁed by CEPII-BACI
classiﬁcation system.28 Since one cannot know which particular imported input is used to produce a
speciﬁc exported product, the correlation with export prices is explored by the average unit value of
exports across products and destinations, Avg lnUV . This is similar to Manova and Zhang (2012),
who however do not investigate the role of ﬁnancing constraints and other ﬁrm-level characteristics,
28BACI is the World trade database developed by the CEPII at a high level of product disaggregation. Original data are
provided by the United Nations Statistical Division (COMTRADE database). The classiﬁcation of products by transfor-
mation level follows the Broad Economic Categories of the UN (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).
19and only include product ﬁxed effects.29 We instead include product-country ﬁxed effects, which
control for characteristics of each imported good that are common within each origin country. Iden-
tiﬁcation comes therefore from variation across ﬁrms that purchase the same inputs from the same
country.
The results (see column 4 in Table 5) show that quality may play a role in the data, as indeed we
ﬁnd a positive association between export and input prices. However, controlling for the correlation
with export prices and other ﬁrm characteristics, the price of imported inputs does not have any sig-
niﬁcant association with ﬁnancing constraints. This corroborates that pricing decisions of constrained
ﬁrms do not reﬂect quality issues.
8 Conclusions
The present paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the role that ﬁnancial constraints play in
shaping ﬁrms’ export performance. We use detailed ﬁrm-product-country data on the international
activities of a sample of ﬁrms covering the vast majority of Italian exports. Exploiting information
on access to credit measured via credit ratings provided by an independent institution, we extend the
existing literature in a number of directions.
First, we ﬁnd that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms export less in value, conditional on entry, and
that they serve fewer countries and ship a narrower range of products. Contraction in the intensive
margin suggests that access to external credit is relevant in the ﬁnancing of both ﬁxed and variables
costs of exporting. At the same time, reduced activity of constrained ﬁrms along product/country
extensive margins hints at the existence of relevant country-speciﬁc and product-speciﬁc ﬁxed costs,
which indeed limit the scope of geographical and product diversiﬁcation. These ﬁndings conﬁrm
previous evidence. However, by fully controlling for selection and possible endogeneity of ﬁnancial
constraints, we show that the effects of FCs are large, and in generally larger than what estimated
when corrections are not taken into account.
Second, by taking a dynamic perspective, we are able to tackle the largely unexplored question
whether ﬁnancing constraints play a role in the dynamic adjustments in product/destination scope
of multi-product/multi-destination ﬁrms over time. We ﬁnd that ﬁnancing constraints increase the
probability to drop products or destinations, and decrease the probability to add new products or new
destinations. More generally, therefore, ﬁnancing constraints tend to hamper an effective reallocation
of resources from (product or destination) markets that over time become less proﬁtable to markets
that becomes more proﬁtable. As above, speciﬁc treatment of selection into export and possible
endogeneity of the ﬁnancing constraint proxy reveal that these effects are sizable.
Finally, this is the ﬁrst paper documenting the interplay between ﬁrm-level credit conditions and
export prices. We show that, once again controlling for selection and endogeneity, constrained ﬁrms
set higher prices as compared to unconstrained ﬁrms which perform transactions in the same product
to the same destination market. The ﬁnding is consistent with models of efﬁciency sorting, where
constrained ﬁrms are predicted to sell at higher prices due to low efﬁciency, and also in line with
the idea that prices are indeed a strategic variable that constrained ﬁrms adjust in the hope to keep
operations and to sustain revenues. Our evidence seems instead to contrast with theories of quality
sorting into export. Since quality is costly, one would expect that constrained ﬁrms reduce prices as
compared to unconstrained ﬁrms, but we observe just the opposite.
29Following Manova and Zhang (2012) average unit value of export is computed as the average of the unit values of all
the export (product-destination)transactions of a ﬁrm (in logs), de-meaned by their product speciﬁc averages (i.e. across
ﬁrms and destinations) and weighted by the share of each transaction in the overall export revenues of a ﬁrm.
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24A Appendix
COE
In compliance with the common framework deﬁned by the European Union (EU), there are different require-
ments in order for a transaction to be recorded, depending on whether the importing country is an EU or
NON-EU country, and on the value of the transaction. As far as outside EU transactions are concerned, there
is a good deal of homogeneity among member states as well as over time. Since the adoption of the Euro,
Italy set the threshold at 620 euro (or 1000 Kg), so that all transactions bigger than 620 euro (or 1000 Kg)
are recorded.For all of these recorded extra-EU transactions, the COE data report complete information, that
is, also information about the product quantity and value. Transactions within the EU are collected according
to a different systems (Intrastat), where the threshold on annual value of transactions qualifying for complete
record are less homogeneous across EU member states, with direct consequences on the type of information
reported in the data. In 2003 (the last year covered in the analysis), there are two cut-offs. If a ﬁrm has more
than 200,000 euro of exports (based on previous year report), then she must ﬁll the Intrastat document monthly.
This implies that complete information about product is also available. Instead, if previous year export value
falls in between 40,000 and 200,000 euro, the quarterly Intrastat ﬁle has to be ﬁlled, implying that only the
amount of export is recorded, while information on the product is not. Firms with previous year exports below
40,000 euro are not required to report any information on trade ﬂows. Thus, ﬁrms which do not appear in COE
are either of this type (i.e. marginal exporters) or do not export at all.
Representativeness
Table 6 shows that the representativeness of the dataset is quite high: although the dataset includes about 20%
of all manufacturing in terms of number of ﬁrms, the data cover about 60% of exporting ﬁrms, and about 84%
of the total value of exports.30 This picture is explained by the well known abundance of micro and small
ﬁrms in Italian manufacturing, together with the observation that the legal status of limited ﬁrm tend to be more
spread across medium-bigger ﬁrms. Yet, despite relatively few in terms of number of active ﬁrms, one expects
that medium-big ﬁrms account for the great bulk of overall export activities in the country. This would be in
line with well established results across different countries. In agreement with this, Table 7 shows that the ﬁrms
in our sample are slightly bigger and more productive, on average, than the population of manufacturing ﬁrms.
At the same time, however, we do not observe big differences when we focus on exporting ﬁrms: the average
size, productivity, export values, number of exported products and number of destinations served do not differ
signiﬁcantly between our sample and the population.
30We report 2003 data, but ﬁgures are comparable in the other years.
25Table 6: Coverage of the dataset, Manufacturing: Number of ﬁrms, number of exporters and export
value (2003)
OVERALL EXPORTERS EXPORT VALUE
ASIA-COE Our dataset Coverage ASIA-COE Our dataset Coverage ASIA-COE Our dataset Coverage
Sector (Number) (Number) % (Number) (Number) % (billion) (billion) %
15 71345 8882 12.45 4926 2875 58.36 12.1 9.4 77.77
17 27762 6408 23.08 5680 3447 60.69 12.5 10.8 86.70
18 41615 6134 14.74 5035 2655 52.73 9.7 8.1 83.56
19 21985 4495 20.45 5688 2644 46.48 10.8 8.8 81.62
20 46584 3550 7.62 2458 978 39.79 1.5 1.3 83.88
21 4566 1951 42.73 1328 884 66.57 4.0 3.8 95.28
22 27344 7801 28.53 2164 1239 57.26 1.7 1.6 91.25
23 443 333 75.17 84 73 86.90 3.8 3.7 99.25
24 6127 3529 57.60 2595 1988 76.61 22.6 16.3 71.80
25 13084 5575 42.61 4421 2970 67.18 10.4 8.9 85.72
26 27230 6218 22.84 4522 2176 48.12 7.2 6.2 86.18
27 3814 1893 49.63 1335 1016 76.10 9.9 8.7 88.21
28 99519 19551 19.65 10280 5774 56.17 12.6 11.2 89.26
29 42391 14710 34.70 12128 8193 67.55 43.3 38.0 87.61
30 1976 822 41.60 262 185 70.61 1.5 1.3 91.19
31 18316 5315 29.02 3214 2131 66.30 8.1 6.6 82.12
32 8671 1665 19.20 911 609 66.85 5.2 3.7 71.02
33 22399 3073 13.72 1920 1357 70.68 4.6 3.9 85.18
34 1962 1122 57.19 918 687 74.84 17.8 15.3 85.86
35 4684 1541 32.90 819 498 60.81 6.7 4.9 73.84
36 50018 7873 15.74 8663 4195 48.42 12.1 10.4 85.96
Total 541835 112441 20.75 79351 46574 58.69 218.1 183.0 83.93
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics: ASIA-COE vs Our dataset (2003)
ASIA-COE Our Dataset
Mean Sd Observations Mean Sd Observations
Manufacturing ﬁrms
lnEmpl  1.12 1.14 541836 2.13 1.38 112441
lnTS Empl  3.78 1.12 518839 4.65 1.09 110160
Manufacturing Exporters
lnEmpl  2.43 1.35 79352 2.85 1.32 46574
lnTS Empl  11.74 0.94 77068 11.99 0.82 46073
lnExport 4.71 2.74 79352 5.52 2.67 46574
#Countries 8.77 12.92 79352 11.66 14.74 46574
#Products 8.04 14.7 79352 10.36 17.15 46574
26B Appendix
We present here descriptive evidence on the different exporting dimensions considered in this work, comparing
NFC and FC ﬁrms. Results refer to 2003, but they remain stable over the sample period.
Figure 1 reports empirical densities of export values, number of exported products and number of destina-
tion countries per ﬁrm (all in logs), together with empirical densities of physical quantities and unit values per
transaction. Visual differences between NFC and FC are statistically conﬁrmed by a Fligner-Policello test of
stochastic dominance.31
Table 8 provides number of observations together with mean and median values of the relevant export
dimension, for the entire sample and the two FC classes, also distinguishing by age of the ﬁrms.
C Appendix
In order to estimate equation (8) according to Procedure 3.2 it is necessary to identify the basket of products
potentially but not actually exported by each ﬁrms. This is indeed a required step to impute ’zeros’ in the dataset
and estimate the Tobit in Procedure 3.2. Since it is not reasonable to assume that each ﬁrm can in principle
export any of the product present in the dataset we constrain their choices on the base of the HS classiﬁcation.
In order to do that we adopt the following procedure:
Procedure C.1
1. we deﬁne product categories PCi based on the HS4 classiﬁcation;
2. we choose one category and we select all the ﬁrms FPCi that export at least one HS6 product inside
PCi;
3. we deﬁne a product list PLPCi containing all the different products exported by the ﬁrms in FPCi;
4. we assign to each ﬁrm in FPCi the value of export of each product in PLPCi if it exists and 0 if not;
5. we repeat 2-4 for each category in PCi and we merge all the data.
After this procedure we obtain a dataset with 10,172,730 observations with about 13% of nonzero ﬁgures. Then
we apply Procedure 3.2 to estimate equation (8).
In estimating equation (9) we do not have a similar problem: it is, indeed, rather reasonable to assume that
a ﬁrm can in principle export in any of the available countries. In this case, however, a computational problem
emerges generated by the high number of possible destinations. We decide to overcome the issue by ranking
all the destination countries in terms of value of export and then simply cutting out the bottom 50% of the
distribution. This seeming drastic cut in the data remove from the dataset less than 0 5% of the total value of
the italian export.
Finally also in estimating equation (13) we face a computational problem due to the size of our dataset.
Indeed, working at the transaction level one hasmore than 6 millions of observations even before inﬂating it
with the zeros. This enourmous amount of data makes unfeasible the application, sic etsimpliciter, of Procedure
4.2. To overcome this problem we implement the following
Procedure C.2
1. draw a 10% panel random subsample from the original dataset;
2. inﬂate the subsample according to Procedure C.1 above;
3. apply Procedure 4.2 to the inﬂated subsample to estimate equation (13).
Then using bootstrapping techniques we derive the point estimate of the parameters of insterest with the
proper measure of error.
31The test is presented in Fligner and Policello (1981) and can be interpreted as a test of stochastic dominance in the
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Figure 1: Figures report kernel density estimates of export value, number of destinations and number
ofexportedproductsatﬁrmlevel,andphysicalquantityandunitvaluesattransactionlevel,comparing
ﬁnancially constrained vs. unconstrained ﬁrms – year 2003. Solid lines represent kernel density
estimates, with 1% conﬁdence band in dashed. Kernel is the standard Epanenchnikov for continuous
variables, and a compact rectangular kernel for the discrete variables. The bandwidth is set according
to the optimal rule presented in Silverman (1986).
28Table 8: EXPORT PERFORMANCE and FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS BY AGE CLASSES - 2003






















































0-4 5,325 1,218.79 7.02 6.90 5.74 2.94 4,302 1,321.30 7.31 7.19 5.78 2.92 1,023 787.71 5.79 5.68 5.53 3.10
(104.22) (3.00) (3.00) (5.70) (2.90) (80.8) (118.05) (3.00) (3.00) (5.73) (2.86) (19.2) (64.00) (3.00) (2.00) (5.44) (3.16)
5-10 8,529 2,074.65 8.15 8.73 5.80 2.93 7,672 2,192.11 8.37 9.02 5.82 2.92 857 1,023.07 6.24 6.16 5.45 3.01
(192.00) (4.00) (4.00) (5.76) (2.86) (90.0) (215.95) (4.00) (4.00) (5.78) (2.86) (10.0) (69.01) (3.00) (2.00) (5.42) (2.91)
11-20 13,100 3,398,35 10.73 11.95 5.88 2.91 12,340 3,507.76 10.95 12.26 5.90 2.90 760 1,621.87 7.17 6.86 5.30 3.39
(412,19) (5.00) (6.00) (5.83) (2.84) (94.2) (445.22) (5.00) (6.00) (5.86) (2.83) (5.8) (97.73) (3.00) (3.00) (5.19) (3.19)
21-30 9,029 4,624.59 12.62 15.05 5.99 2.82 8,705 4,690.40 12.78 15.28 6.00 2.82 324 2,856.26 8.40 8.87 5.47 3.19
(774.57) (7.00) (9.00) (5.97) (2.77) (96.4) (815,52) (7.00) (9.00) (5.98) (2.76) (3.6) (163,62) (4.00) (4.00) (5.35) (3.14)
30-∞∗ 5,838 9,762.80 15.31 18.08 6.21 2.75 5,661 9,887.17 15.50 18.33 6.20 2.75 177 5,785.01 9.47 10.12 6.51 2.70
(1,247.18) (8.00) (12.00) (6.10) (2.73) (97.00) (1,315.28) (8.00) (12.00) (6.10) (2.73) (3.0) (209.43) (3.00) (4.00) (6.37) (2.61)
Total∗ 41,821 4,004.06 10.78 12.18 5.97 2.85 38,680 4,203.69 11.11 12.62 5.98 2.84 3,141 1,548.74 6.72 6.68 5.54 3.13
(403.73) (5.00) (6.00) (5.91) (2.80) (92.5) (458.88) (5.00) (6.00) (5.93) (2.79) (7.5) (82.46) (3.00) (3.00) (5.44) (3.05)
Export values in thousands of euro, quantities in (log) Kg and UV in (log) euro/Kg.
∗Statistics in these lines are computed removing one very large ﬁrm in the FC class. Including this observation, mean values of export, number of products, number of countries, (log) quantity and (log) unit value are 10,735, 15.35,
18.10, 5.97 and 2.86 for the whole sample and 37,719.60, 10.87, 10.61, 5.59 and 3.12 for the FC ﬁrms older than 30 years (cfr. line ’30-∞’). If we pool together different age class (cfr. line ’Total’) for the whole sample we get
4,140.19, 10.79, 12.18, 5.97 and 2.86 while for FC ﬁrms 3,359.24, 6.80, 6.70, 5.59 and 3.12.
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